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1. THE DEBATE 
The share of countries which are restricting the free flow of capital has declined world-wide in 
the past decades. Whereas, in 1970, about 80 percent of all countries regularly surveyed by the 
IMF had restrictions on capital flows, this share had dropped to about 66 percent in 1998 
(Table 1).  
Table 1   
Restrictions on Capital Flows 1970-1998 
 1970 1980 1990 1998 
Number of reporting countries 117 140 153 184 
Share of countries with restrictions on capital  
account transactions (%) 
79 75 78 66 
Share of countries imposing restrictions  
on cross-border financial credits (%) 
– –. – 62 
Source: IMF (1999) 
 
At the same time, the financial crises that hit South-East Asia, Russia, or Brazil in recent years 
highlighted the potential risks of integrating emerging market economies into international capital 
markets. What is particularly troublesome about the events in Asia is that financial crises have hit 
countries which had long been praised for their strong reliance on long-term foreign direct 
investment to finance current account imbalances. Yet, as it turned out, they had incurred 
substantial short-term debts and proved to be just as vulnerable to reversals of capital flows as 
many other developing countries, notably in Latin America, before. There are two features of 
these crises that have both stimulated the academic debate on the risks and benefits of capital 
account liberalization and have prompted various new policy initiatives:  
First, high shares of short-term capital flows seem to make countries vulnerable to financial 
crises. If short-term capital flows (suddenly) reverse, countries are forced into severe adjustment 
crises. Second, structural weaknesses in domestic banking systems have been singled out as a ma-
jor contributing factor to the emergence and spreading of currency crises. If foreign capital is 
channeled mainly through commercial banks, and if the incentive systems of these banks are 
distorted, foreign funds are likely to be invested inefficiently. Also, if commercial banks have a 
high exposure to foreign exchange rate risks, a devaluation of the domestic currency will reduce 
their net worth, thus surpressing capital inflows and further aggravating balance of payments 
problems. 
The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe are a group of countries for which 
policy lessons from earlier crises are particularly urgent. The more advanced reform countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Estonia have temporarily had capital inflows 
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amounting to more than 10 percent of GDP in the past couple of years. While foreign direct 
investment has been important for these economies, portfolio investment and other short-term 
capital flows have increased as well recently. Sustainable current account positions have thus 
become a major policy issue for the reform countries (EBRD 1998; Fries et al. 1998).  
The possible causal relationship between capital account liberalization and the occurance of 
currency crises1 has spurred a debate on possible remedies and a reform of the international „fi-
nancial architecture“. The proposals that are being discussed comprise improving reporting stan-
dards and disclosure requirements, new standards for the international activities of commercial 
banks, an improved coordination of international financial market supervision, or a re-definition 
of the role of the International Monetary Fund. One of the most far-reaching and also the most 
controversial proposal is the re-introduction of capital controls, in particular controls on short-
term capital.2 Yet, for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the maintenance or 
imposition of restrictions on capital account transactions may not be warranted in view of the 
envisaged membership in the European Union of these economies and of the commitments 
towards capital account convertibility made under membership in the OECD.  
The aim of this paper is fourfold. First, we present stylized facts on the integration of 
international financial markets, emphasizing in particular the volatility of capital flows, and the 
role of the advanced transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (section 2). Second, we 
discuss the risks and benefits of financial market integration in general (Section 3). We discuss 
the links between cross-border capital flows and economic growth, focusing on the effects of 
capital flows on domestic savings and investment, on the role of capital flows in the international 
propagation of new technological knowhow, and on the impact of capital flows on the efficiency 
of the domestic financial sector. Subsequently we discuss the determinants of the structure of 
capital flows, their volatility characteristics, and the ensuing implications for the vulnerability of 
recipient countries to balance-of-payments crises and contagion. 
Third, we discuss the role of banks in financial crises and possible policy measures at the 
national level (Section 4). The focus of the analysis is on the potential advantages that the market 
entry of foreign banks can bring for the transition economies, and we discuss the links between 
banking and balance of payments crises, i.e. the so-called “twin crises”. 
Finally, we deal with the special risks and benefits of short-term capital flows and present 
empirical evidence on the expected change in the share of short-term capital for selected 
transition economies (Section 5). We discuss whether the implementation of a tax on short-term 
capital flows can make the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe less vulnerable to 
_______________ 
1  Empirical evidence does in fact show that currency crises are more frequent in those countries that have 
previously liberalized capital flows (see Kaminsky and Reinhard 1998). 
2  The original proposal stems from Tobin (1978). 
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adverse external shocks and to sudden withdrawals of foreign capital. Section 6 concludes and 
summarizes the main arguments. 
2. GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCIAL MARKET 
In this section, we survey the evidence on the degree of integration of global capital markets, and 
on the the volatility of capital flows. We focus in particular on the Central and Eastern European 
candidates for EU accession. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia have 
started negotiations with the EU about accession in March 1998 and have opened in summer 
2000 the last of the 31 different chapters of the "acquis communautaire", which represents the 
complete framework of EU legislation. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia have 
started negotiations about EU accession in February 2000. Under optimistic assumptions about 
the progress of the negotiations concerning the acquis communautaire and of the necessary 
reforms of EU institutions, EU accession for the most advanced transition countries could be 
feasible in the year 2005 or 2006. 
2.1. Volume and Structure of International Capital Flows 
The on-going academic debate on how to measure the degree of financial integration and capital 
mobility appropriately has still not been settled. Nevertheless, most empirical studies come to the 
conclusion that the degree of international capital mobility is much higher today than at any time 
since the First World War. Emerging markets in particular participate in international capital 
flows to an increasing degree. These developments certainly reflect the progressive liberalization 
of capital flows during the past decades but also the substantial technical progress which has 
eased the movement of capital across borders.  
At the same time, there is ample evidence that the degree of capital mobility today is not 
extraordinarily large compared to earlier episodes. Taking a long-run perspective, Obstfeld and 
Taylor (1997) find that interest rate differentials between the UK and the US were relatively small 
during the time of the pre-1914 Gold Standard. Subsequently, and in particular during the Second 
World War, interest differentials increased considerably; a similar widening could be observed in 
the late Bretton Woods period. Recent data show a decline of interest rate differentials to levels 
observed at the turn of the past century.3 For Europe, Lemmen (1998) finds that covered interest 
parity conditions provide strong support for an increasing degree of financial integration over 
time. Likewise, Obstfeld (1995) shows close linkages between on- and offshore rates for most 
developed markets while arguing that less-developed countries show a lower degree of 
integration. 
_______________ 
3  Similar results are obtained for a measure of real interest parity (Obstfeld and Taylor 1997). 
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Apart from arbitrage tests of capital mobility, the most often used and, at the same, the most 
often criticized measure of capital mobility is the one suggested by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
The intuition behind this measure is that, under perfect capital mobility, the marginal product of 
capital would be equalized across all countries. An exogenous increase in the savings rate in one 
country would therefore lead to increased investment in all countries. As regards the empirical 
measurement, Feldstein and Horioka found a close link between national savings and investment, 
and this result has been confirmed by a host of subsequent studies.4 Although there is evidence 
for an increase in capital mobility in recent decades based on this measure, international capital 
mobility would thus have remained imperfect. Taking a longer-term perspective, Taylor (1996) 
shows that the level of capital mobility that had been achieved in the early 1990s can be seen as a 
return to the levels observed already during the time of the Gold Standard. For the transition 
economies, Buch (1999) compares estimates of the savings-investment correlation to those for the 
southern members of the EU. The comparison shows that the transition economies have reached a 
similar degree of integration in quantitative terms.  
While differences between domestic savings and investment correspond to net capital flows, a 
simple, yet intuitive alternative way to measure financial market integration is the volume of 
gross capital flows. Relating gross international capital flows to gross domestic financial flows, 
Golub (1990) reaches similar conclusions as the literature that focuses on net flows: capital 
mobility has remained incomplete but has been on the rise. For OECD countries, Buch und 
Pierdzioch (2000) show that gross capital in- and outflows typically move quite parallel and have 
increased quite significantly in the second half of the 1990s. Net capital flows, to the contrary, 
have remained relatively flat. Still, the volume of cross-border capital flows relative to gross 
domestic product tends to be relatively small, reaching about 10 percent of GDP for most 
developed markets.5 For some transition economies, gross capital flows have been decidedly 
larger during the past decade, and net capital inflows have typically closely tracked gross inflows 
(0 on page Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
Buch and Piazolo (2001) assess expected changes in the magnitude of capital flows to 
transition economies, focusing in particular on the role of EU enlargement. Their results suggest 
that countries that join the EU are likely to receive more capital from other EU countries than 
from countries which are not members of the Union. For most EU accession countries, actual 
levels of capital flows are still far below the expected values. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland stand out and have come closest to the expected values. However, if one accounts for an 
additional EU effect, even these three advanced transition countries have not yet reached the 
levels we would expect to see under full EU membership. For the other seven accession 
countries, there generally remains a substantial gap between the actual data and the expected 
_______________ 
4  See Bayoumi (1990, 1999), Coakley et al. (1995), Montiel (1994), Sinn (1992), or Taylor (1996) for surveys. 
5  The exceptions are countries such as Switzerland or the United Kingdom which host international financial 
centers. 
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levels. Consequently, the results imply a considerable integration effect with regard to capital 
flows, particularly for the second round candidates for EU accession. 
Table 2a 
Structure of Gross International Capital Flows in the 1990s 
 Share in global capital flows (%) Structure of capital flows (%) 
 Industrialized 
countriesa 
Developing coun-
tries 
Industrialized 
countriesa 
Developing coun-
tries 
Outflows 88.6 7.4 100.0 100.0 
FDI 93.7 6.3 22.6 18.0 
Portfolio invest-
ment 
93.7 4.5 38.1 21.6 
Other investments 81.8 10.5 39.4 60.4 
Inflows 79.0 18.1 100.0 100.0 
FDI 60.1 38.3 13.2 36.8 
Portfolio 
investment 
84.7 13.0 46.2 31.0 
Other investments 80.2 14.8 40.2 32.2 
Averages for the years 1991-1997. a) Excluding international organizations.  
Source: IMF (1998) 
 
With regard to the structure of international capital flows, developing countries differ from 
developed countries (Table 2a). In the 1990s, gross  capital inflows for industrialized countries 
were dominated by portfolio investments and other investments. FDI accounted for a relatively 
small share of 13 percent. Developing countries, in contrast, relied on FDI much more heavily. In 
fact, the three sources of finance were of roughly equal importance. As for capital outflows, the 
pattern for industrialized countries by and large resembled the pattern for inflows. For developing 
countries, in contrast, other investment outflows dominated (60 percent), FDI and portfolio in-
vestment were of similar importance. 
For transition economies, other investments (bank loans and trade credits) mostly dominated 
the picture, making up between 40 and 60 percent of all inflows, except for Hungary and Poland, 
where they were negative because of the repayment of foreign debt, and Bulgaria, where they had 
a much higher share (Table 2b). FDI came second with shares between 27 and 66 percent, except 
for Poland, where the share was much higher, and Bulgaria, where it was hugely negative. 
Portfolio investments generally were least important, although they made up a share of almost 40 
percent in Hungary. Compared to the overall pattern in Table 2a, for the transition economies the 
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share of FDI in total inflows was broadly similar to the FDI share of developing economies, 
whereas other investments were more, and portfolio investments were less important.  
Table 2b 
Structure of Gross Capital Inflows into Transition Economies, 1990–1999 
 Foreign Direct  
Investment 
Portfolio  
Investment 
Other  
Investments 
Czech Republic 34.9 13.2 51.9 
Estonia 41.8 17.1 41.2 
Hungary 65.9 38.7 –4.3 
Poland 116.1 18.6 –34.7 
Slovenia 27.5 24.6 47.8 
Mean 1st round candidates 57.2 22.4 20.4 
Bulgaria –128.5 8.9 219.6 
Latria 37.7 4.5 57.8 
Lithuania 34.9 13.1 52.0 
Romania 46.7 1.6 51.7 
Slovakia 32.7 13.3 54.0 
Mean 2nd round  
candidates 
4.7 8.3 87.0 
Mean overall 31.0 15.4 53.7 
Source: IMF (2000) 
 
A significant difference emerges when comparing the structure of capital inflows between the 
first- and second round accession candidates. For the first round countries, FDI clearly dominated 
the picture, partly due to the exceptionally large weight of this category for Poland, whereas for 
the second round countries other investments dwarf everything due to the exceptionally large 
weight of this category for Bulgaria. But even when leaving out these two outliers, FDI still had 
the largest share in the first-round countries, whereas other investments dominated for the 
second-round countries. 
As regards changes in the structure of global capital flows over time, there certainly is a trend 
towards an increasing securitization of financial assets. Bank credits, in particular, are 
increasingly being substituted through bonds which are easier to trade, a trend which has been 
promoted through improvements in information technology. Hence, while the degree of capital 
mobility to date might not differ much from the degree of capital mobility at the turn of the 
previous century in quantitative terms, it does certainly differ in qualitative terms. At the same 
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time, it should not be overlooked that banks are still playing a crucial role in providing access to 
international financial markets for small and mid-sized firms (Eichengreen and Mody 2000). 
Generally, the observed stylized facts are in line with theoretical models which explain 
international capital flows. Applications of the pecking order theory of finance to an international 
setting (Razin et al. 1998, Hull and Tesar 2001) conclude that the share of bank finance can be 
expected to fall over the course of economic development, mainly because information costs tend 
to decline.  
An additional piece of evidence which is of interest when analyzing trends in international 
capital flows is the share of short-term capital. After all, a high exposure to and large swings of 
short-term capital are often held responsible for the occurrence of currency crises. Unfortunately, 
however, standard balance of payments statistics give only an insufficient measure of this share. 
Inflows of financial credits and portfolio capital flows are often not classified according to their 
maturity. Data provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) on the maturity structure 
of bank lending towards countries outside the BIS reporting area can be used as an indicator 
though (Graph 1). These data show that the share of short-term loans in total lending has shifted 
upward when comparing the early 1990s to the 1980s. While, in the 1980s, roughly 40 percent of 
all foreign loans had a maturity of less than one year, this share increased to more than 50 percent 
in the early 1990s. It has come down again since 1998 (World Bank 2001). 
Overall, Mussa et al. (1999) note that there seems not to have been a secular trend towards an 
increasing share of short-term foreign debt in recent decades. Yet, they confirm the evidence 
presented in Graph 1: remaining maturities have tended to shorten during the boom phase of large 
capital flows between the late 1980s and mid-1990s while they lengthened afterwards. 
Figure 1   
Short-Term Loans (% of Total Foreign Loans Granted to Countries Outside the BIS Re-
porting Area) 1980-1998 
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Source: BIS (1999). 
Yet, these aggregated data cloud substantial differences between different groups of countries 
(Table 3). In the 1990s, short-term liabilities towards international banks were particularly high in 
Asia (values of more than 60 percent prior to the Asian financial crises), and reached about 50 
percent in Latin America. The share of short-term capital has been below average for the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe in contrast (about 40 percent).  
Table 3   
Share of Short-Term International Bank Credits by Country (%) 1992–2000 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Asia 59.0 62.8 62.9 63.5 61.5 60.6 52.5 46.0 47.5 
Eastern Europe 27.3 37.2 35.2 39.1 44.2 43.4 36.0 39.4 41.0 
Czech Republic ... ... 40.4 48.6 49.3 50.0 58.8 53.5 52.0 
Hungary 23.8 26.9 30.7 34.6 39.2 34.2 34.7 29.5 30.6 
Poland 31.4 33.1 23.2 29.6 33.2 38.1 40.7 39.7 37.2 
Slovenia ... ... 39.8 30.9 17.8 21.2 22.9 22.0 20.8 
Latin America 43.4 50.0 51.3 52.3 53.7 54.8 51.8 48.3 49.0 
Argentina 47.6 52.6 53.4 56.5 44.8 61.4 54.8 52.5 52.6 
Brazil 48.5 54.8 50.3 56.0 63.0 64.1 56.0 54.1 53.7 
Chile 42.7 52.4 53.7 54.7 51.2 49.8 39.6 32.8 38.3 
Mexico 42.4 47.1 51.3 45.4 60.1 61.3 44.9 38.2 38.1 
Source: BIS (2000). 
 
To summarize, global capital mobility — as measured by arbitrage conditions, investment-
savings correlations, and gross international flows — remains imperfect but has risen 
substantially in recent decades. For the transition economies considered in this paper, these 
measures suggest a degree of integration into international capital markets similar to that 
achieved by the Southern members of the EU. Nonetheless, simulation results suggest that the 
imminent accession to the EU might lead to significant additional capital inflows to the accession 
countries from current EU members. In view of the balance of payments constraints that the 
transition economies are facing and the already high capital inflows of recent years, in particular 
for the first round accession states, we would expect mainly a change in the structure of capital 
flows, however, away from FDI and bank lending to portfolio investments. 
Clear differences exist between developed and developing economies with regard to the 
structure of capital flows. Whereas portfolio inflows dominate in developed economies, 
developing economies rely on portfolio capital, foreign direct investment, and other investments 
in roughly equal proportions. The transition economies covered here do not readily fit either of 
ICEG EC Working Paper Claudia M. Buch, Ralph P. Heinrich: Capital Flows to Transition Economies 
 
 
12 
these patterns. Bank lending has been the most important source of capital inflows for them, 
followed by FDI. This is particularly pronounced for the second-round accession candidates. In 
terms of the maturity structure of international capital flows, short-term debt flows rose during 
the lending boom of the early 1990s, and fell thereafter. Among emerging markets, Asia had an 
exceptionally high exposure to short-term foreign debt before the 1987 meltdown, while the 
exposure of the transition economies covered here has been below average. 
2.2. Volatility of International Capital Flows 
Recent financial crises have shifted interest away from measures of the degree of capital mobility 
towards measures of the volatility characteristics of different capital account items. This shift has 
been prompted by the observation that capital flows to emerging markets often tend to be 
relatively volatile and that this may hold in particular for short-term capital flows. Since, as the 
previous section has shown, developing and developed countries differ with regard to the 
structure of capital flows, the key issue is thus to what extent these differences have an impact on 
the volatility of capital flows. 
In contrast to the extensive policy debate on the volatility of capital flows, sound empirical 
evidence on volatility patterns is rather scarce. Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1993) have been 
among the first to draw attention to the fact that standard balance of payments labels provide rela-
tively little information on the actual volatility of capital flows. One result of the analysis is that 
there is no consistent pattern of persistence across different capital flows.  
Figure 2   
Number of OECD Countries Experiencing Large Capital In- and Outflows 1978-1998 
a) Increase in capital outflows (three-percent threshold) 
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b) Increase in capital outflows (six-percent threshold) 
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c) Increase in capital inflows (six-percent threshold) 
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Source: IMF (2000), own calculations. 
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Also, short-term capital flows tend to be at least as predictable as other capital flows. The 
results also show that there is substantial substitution between different types of capital flows. 
Sarno and Taylor (1999) analyze differences in the magnitude of the permanent and transitory 
components of capital flows. Their results suggest that both private portfolio investments 
(comprising equity and debt flows) and official flows are driven by a very strong temporary, 
short-term component. Cross-border commercial bank credits and particularly foreign direct 
investment flows by contrast have a strong permanent component. 
In contrast to these papers, the focus of Chuhan et al. (1996) has been on the interplay among 
capital flows. Their results indicate that (changes in) FDI might account for a substantial fraction 
of the subsequent variation of short-term investment. Also, short-term investment flows tend to 
be more sensitive to changes affecting short-term investment flows to other countries whereas, in 
the majority of cases, similar conclusions cannot be drawn when FDI flows are considered. Thus, 
disturbances hitting international financial markets might spill over more easily onto short-term 
inflows than onto foreign direct investment inflows. 
Further evidence on the volatility of capital flows has been documented in Mussa et al. (1999). 
Using gross private capital flows to emerging markets, they find that the variance of capital flows 
has been higher in the second half of the 1990s than in earlier periods. However, no such general 
pattern is found when net capital flows are used. When breaking down total capital flows into 
their components, FDI turns out to be the most stable, followed by portfolio capital, and bank 
credits. 
In order to assess the welfare implications of financial market integration, it is not only of inte-
rest to what extent capital flows fluctuate around a long-term trend, it is also of interest how 
frequent large capital flow reversals are. If fluctuations of (net) capital flows cancel out quickly, 
implications for the real sector might be modest. If, however, capital flows swing for a prolonged 
period, policy adjustment might be necessary but may not be forthcoming as quickly as needed. 
Mussa et al. (1999) define a reversal of capital flows as a reduction in net capital inflows by 
more than 3 or 6 percent of GDP. Looking at data for 17 emerging markets, which accounted for 
75 percent of capital flows to emerging markets for the 1970s through 1990s, they find that large 
reversals have become more frequent in the 1990s. 
Graph 2 reproduces the results of Mussa et al. (1999) for OECD countries. We plot both 
reversals of net and gross flows, using a three- and a six-percent threshold level (relative to GDP). 
When using the three-percent threshold, reversals of net capital flows have appeared relatively 
frequently. As regards gross capital flows, relatively more large reversals have been observed in 
two periods, in the early 1980s and the early 1990s. These are also the two periods which have 
seen very large reversals of capital flows, exceeding the six-percent threshold. Moreover, the 
number of countries affected by large capital reversals seems to have increased in the 1990s 
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relative to the 1980s, at least when gross flows are considered. This largely supports the evidence 
from developing countries. 
In addition, there is some evidence for increased large inflows of foreign capital into developed 
countries in the late 1990s. While emerging markets have witnessed quite substantial outflows of 
foreign capital in the later half of the decade, the reverse holds true for OECD countries, which 
have witnessed quite substantial increases in capital inflows during this time. In this sense, 
developments in the OECD-area mirror-image developments in emerging markets, reflecting a re-
allocation of international capital flows. 
3. RISKS AND BENEFITS OF FREE CAPITAL FLOWS 
The previous section has argued that developments on international capital markets are governed 
by five major tendencies. The degree of international capital mobility has increased continuously 
over the past decades, but has not necessarily reached an all-time high. As regards the structure of 
capital flows, we observe a general tendency towards securitization. Moreover, the share of short-
term bank credit has grown in the 1990s, but it remains unclear whether this trend will continue 
in the future. Marked differences exist in the structure of capital inflows of countries of different 
levels of economic development. Foreign direct investment and cross-border bank credits are mo-
re important in developing than in industrialized countries. Finally, care should be taken when 
classifying capital flows according to their volatility. It is necessary in particular to control for 
feedback effects between different types of capital flows in order to arrive at an accurate measure 
of volatility. 
The following section discusses the welfare effects of growing international capital flows. We 
will discuss both aggregate effects, i.e. the link between capital flows on the one hand and in-
vestment and growth on the other hand, and effects on the efficiency of the domestic financial in-
dustry.  We conclude by discussing the causes and consequences of currency crises. 
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3.1. Benefits: Growth, Consumption Smoothing and Portfolio  
Diversification  
Basically, there are a number of positive effects that can be expected of free international capital 
flows. Free international capital markets can contribute to allocating capital to its most productive 
uses across national boundaries. They enable countries to smooth over cyclical fluctuations in 
GDP through capital imports and exports, thereby preventing these fluctuations from fully 
feeding through to domestic consumption and investment. Moreover, free international capital 
movements facilitate international portfolio diversification and can thus insulate investment 
returns from domestic fluctuations. International capital movements can also play an important 
role in the transfer of new technologies, something that is of particular relevance for developing 
countries. And finally, international capital flows can contribute to creating more efficient do-
mestic financial systems and can in this way contribute to faster economic growth.  
However, there is no guarantee that these potential advantages of international capital move-
ments will materialize. Whether the full benefits of capital market integration will be reaped de-
pends on a number of factors. There is good reason to think that developing and industrialized 
countries differ in the effects of different types of capital flows and the channels through which 
these effects play out. Even across developing countries, the effects and channels of impact may 
differ. For instance, growth effects will depend on whether foreign capital inflows substitute or 
complement domestic savings. Moreover, developing countries may fail to reap the full benefits 
of integration because of a lack of human capital endowment. Similarly, restrictive foreign trade 
regimes can create distortions which prevent capital flows from benefiting the host country. In 
what follows we discuss these issues in more detail. 
With free international capital movements, it is possible to channel investments into those 
countries and sectors where the productivity of capital is highest, irrespective of national savings 
rates and income levels. Efficient investment projects which might go unrealized for lack of na-
tional savings can be financed through capital imports. Conversely, domestic savings can be ex-
ported if there are not enough worthwhile investment projects available in the domestic economy. 
However, the effects of capital imports on economic growth depend critically on whether do-
mestic savings are supplemented or replaced by capital imports, and whether capital imports lead 
to additional investment in the receiving country (Edwards 1998). To be sure, welfare rises even 
if capital imports are used exclusively to finance additional consumption. But consuming current 
capital imports runs the risk of future insolvency, especially if the capital imports are in the form 
of international debt. Obstfeld (1995) finds for developing economies that capital imports in prac-
tice partially crowd out domestic savings, but still lead to higher domestic investment on a net ba-
sis.  
The Asian tiger economies by contrast had sizeable capital imports and exceptionally high do-
mestic savings rates simultaneously for an extended period of time. The conjecture was that in 
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these economies, capital imports and domestic savings supplemented each other (Turner 1995). 
More recently however, Reinhart and Talvi (1998) have shown that even in these economies for-
eign capital inflows have been correlated negatively with domestic savings when corrected for the 
long-term autonomous trend in domestic savings. 
Not all types of capital inflows are alike, though (Bosworth und Collins 1999). Foreign direct 
investment not only has by far the strongest positive impact on domestic investment, it also leads 
to additional domestic savings. By contrast, portfolio inflows at best have a small impact on both 
domestic investment and savings. Foreign bank credit is in between these two extremes. On aver-
age, half of overall gross capital imports are being used to finance additional investment. The 
other half goes to the build-up of foreign currency reserves and to capital exports of the receiving 
country.  
In addition to the effects on domestic savings and investment, the impact of foreign capital in-
flows crucially depends on the human capital endowment of the receiving country. This influ-
ences both how attractive a country is for foreign capital and how much the country is able to 
benefit from foreign capital. Without considering human capital, it is difficult to explain the di-
rection of international capital flows. Traditional growth accounting, according to which the mar-
ginal product of capital should be lower in developed than in developing economies due to the 
larger capital stocks of the former, would imply that capital should flow mainly from rich to poor 
economies. However, this is not the case in reality. The bulk of international capital flows occurs 
between developed economies (cf. Table 2a above). This seeming contradiction can be resolved 
by allowing for complementarities between physical and human capital, such that the marginal 
product of capital is higher in countries with larger human capital endowments (Lucas 1990). 
The human capital endowment of the host country is particularly important when it comes to 
using foreign capital inflows as a way to absorb new technologies. The new growth theory has 
shown that technological innovation can initiate and sustain long-term economic growth (Romer 
1990, Grossman und Helpman 1991). Foreign direct investment in particular can play a pivotal 
role in this process. It can directly go hand in hand with imports of new technology. But in addi-
tion, it can contribute to transfering new management techniques and new ways of organizing 
production efficiently. These effects can be expected to be particularly pronounced if the new 
knowledge spills over from foreign subsidiaries to domestic firms, be it through subcontractor 
and supplier relationships, be it through copycat competition (Bertschek 1995). This can further 
stimulate domestic investment. 
On an empirical level, it has turned out to be difficult to establish a clear link between foreign 
direct investment and economic growth (Nunnenkamp 2000). Recent research by UNCTAD 
(1999) fails to find a positive impact of foreign direct investment on growth. Soto (1999) finds a 
positive impact only when assuming a non-linear relationship between foreign direct investment 
and domestic savings. Worse, the estimation coefficients lack robustness. These findings under-
score the importance of human capital in enabling the host economy to absorb new knowledge 
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and technologies. Foreign direct investment has been found to have a strongly positive impact on 
economic growth only in countries with a sufficiently high level of human capital endowment 
(Borensztein et al. 1994). In these countries, foreign direct investment has also been more produc-
tive than investment by domestic firms. 
Apart from human capital endowment, the trade regime also plays a critical role for the growth 
effects of foreign direct investment. In contrast to export-oriented countries, hardly any positive 
growth effects could be found for countries following import substitution strategies (Balasubra-
manyam et al. 1996). 
The integration of international capital markets can improve aggregate welfare not just by ena-
bling countries to tap foreign savings to finance domestic investment. International capital mobil-
ity also allows investors to optimally diversify their portfolios.6 Portfolio theory in fact holds im-
portant implications in particular for capital flows between developing and developed economies. 
The potential for risk diversification is particularly high given that asset returns are typically 
weakly or even negatively correlated across these two groups of countries. Reisen (1996) argues 
that international portfolio diversification can lead to substantial welfare gains for both groups of 
countries: developed economies can partially solve their problems with providing for their ageing 
populations, developing economies can grow faster. 
It has to be said, however, that so far investors have taken advantage of the opportunity for 
international portfolio diversification only to a very limited extent. Empirically, investors have 
preferred to keep the vast bulk of their savings in home country assets.7 The reasons for this home 
bias are still not very well understood. Possible explanations range from tax incentives to 
asymmetric information to frictions in the international integration of markets for goods.8 
Finally, an important channel through which the integration of capital markets may generate 
positive welfare effects are improvements in the efficiency of the domestic financial system. Both 
theoretical arguments and empirical results suggest that the development of the financial system 
is closely linked to economic development and growth (Levine 1997). The new growth theory has 
identified two main channels of permanent economic growth: capital accumulation and increasing 
returns to scale (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988) as well as the development of new products and pro-
duction processes (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1991). The financial system contributes 
to lower information and transaction costs. It promotes the amount of risk sharing among agents, 
allocates capital, mobilizes savings, and provides liquidity for the trading in goods and services. 
If it fulfills these roles efficiently, it thus promotes economic growth. 
_______________ 
6  See also Feldstein (2000).  
7  See French and Poterba (1990, 1991) or Tesar and Werner (1992).  
8  See Lewis (1999) or Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
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International capital mobility can play a crucial role in this. It can help to lower risks, it can fa-
cilitate the transfer of innovations across boundaries, and it can contribute to the development of 
an efficient domestic financial industry in three ways. First, international capital mobility gives 
enterprises access to the world capital market and allows them to overcome the drawbacks of an 
underdeveloped domestic financial system (Klein und Olivei 1999). Second, international capital 
mobility can increase the liquidity of the capital markets of small economies. The liquidity of 
domestic capital markets has been found to be an important determinant of economic growth (Le-
vine und Zavros 1998). Third, international capital mobility can increase competitive pressure 
and can thereby encourage efficiency-enhancing reforms in the domestic financial sector. Inter 
alia, it can be shown how opening up market access for foreign banks can lower domestic financ-
ing costs and can thereby contribute to more investment into human capital, research and devel-
opment, and eventually to higher growth (Baldwin und Forslid 1996). 
Accordingly, Klein und Olivei (1999) empirically find a significantly positive relationship be-
tween free capital flows and financial development on the one hand, and between financial devel-
opment and economic growth on the other hand. However, it appears that the link between free 
capital flows and financial development holds mostly for OECD countries. This would suggest 
that developed and developing economies differ at least in the channels through which interna-
tional capital flows affect domestic economies. This result ties in with the result of Section 2.1 
that developed and developing economies differ in the structure of the capital flows they attract. 
Conceivably, portfolio investments and bank credits, which dominate capital flows between de-
veloped economies, contribute more to financial development than foreign direct investment, 
which is more important for developing countries. Alternatively, the greater weight of portfolio 
investments in the capital inflows of developed economies may be a result rather than a cause of 
the higher level of development of their financial systems. 
3.2. Risks: Balance of Payments Crises and Contagion Effects 
The experience of recent years has reinforced the point that the liberalization of international 
capital movements can not just bring benefits, but also carries the risk of balance of payments 
crises with their attendant adverse consequences for economic growth. Of particular concern is 
the risk of countries pursuing sound domestic policies and yet being drawn into crises erupting 
elsewhere. In this section, we therefore discuss the factors that may cause balance of payments 
crises and the potential for contagion effects across countries. 
Balance of payments crises can have a variety of causes. They can be caused by inconsistencies 
in domestic economic policies, most notably between exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies 
(Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1984). A typical example would be attempts to fix the nomi-
nal exchange rate while at the same time monetizing fiscal deficits. As the domestic component 
of the monetary base grows over time, the exchange rate peg can be maintained only by running 
down international reserves. Eventually, the markets lose confidence in the peg, a speculative at-
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tack occurs, already low international reserves are depleted completely, and the peg has to be 
abandoned. Apart from inconsistencies in macroeconomic policies, inconsistencies on the micro-
economic level can cause problems as well. In particular, balance of payments crises often erupt 
more or less simultaneously with crises in the domestic banking sector (Kaminsky und Reinhart 
1996, 1999). More on this will be said in Section 4 below.  
However, balance of payments crises can occur even if domestic economic policy avoids these 
and other inconsistencies (Obstfeld 1986). In this case, market expectations are pivotal. In princi-
ple, it is always possible to defend a fixed exchange rate against speculative attacks by raising in-
terest rates to punitive levels and thereby reducing the supply of domestic currency. But in the 
event of a massive speculative attack, the extreme monetary contraction necessary to defend the 
peg may involve excessive short-term losses of output and employment. The political pressure to 
abandon the peg may then become unbearable. The devaluation expectations which precipitated 
the attack then turn out to have been self-fulfilling. At the same time, it is possible that the ex-
change rate peg could have been sustained indefinitely if no speculative attack had occurred. I.e. 
if the market’s expectations were for the peg to be sustained, then this expectation would turn out 
to be self-fulfilling as well. At times, seemingly minor events can coordinate market expectations 
one way or the other and can thus trigger successful speculative attacks. 
Self-fulfilling attacks on countries with otherwise sound policies notwithstanding, the recent 
empirical literature on balance of payments crises has identified a number of indicators which 
yield good ex-post forecasts of past crises (Kaminsky und Reinhart 1998, Kaminsky et al. 1998). 
Dwindling export revenues, rising current account deficits, deviations of the real exchange rate 
from its long-term trend, high and rising foreign borrowing, especially by the public sector, high 
and rising domestic inflation, and declining international reserves have been found to be useful 
indicators to watch. Indications of possible danger ahead could be found as long as two years 
prior to the actual eruption of the crisis. 
The developments captured by these indicators can obviously be influenced by domestic  eco-
nomic policy. This is why these results suggest that as a rule domestic policy makers are not pow-
erless when it comes to preventing balance of payments crises or at least cushioning their impact. 
Inter alia, the Asian meltdown of 1997 did not actually hit out of a blue sky; as early as 18 months 
before the crisis, clear signs of trouble could have been detected, especially in domestic financial 
systems (Kaminsky und Reinhart 1999).  
However, despite the important role domestic economic policy can play in making integration 
into international capital markets successful, the potential for contagion across national bounda-
ries does exist. Contagion effects can arise for instance if international investors restructure their 
entire portfolios in response to changed expectations for one country (Schinasi und Smith 1999). 
Balance of payments crises can create liquidity needs in international investors and can prompt 
them to liquidate positions in countries originally not affected by the crisis. This can cause a sud-
den reversal particularly of short-term capital flows (Montiel und Reinhart 1997) and can push a 
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country and its financial sector into a liquidity crisis (Goldfajn und Valdez 1995). A similar effect 
can arise if international markets lack sufficient information on differences in the economic situa-
tion of different countries. Investors may then respond to a crisis in one country by indiscrimi-
nately withdrawing their capital also from other, seemingly similar countries. 
There has been an intense debate in the literature on the appropriate definition of contagion 
effects. Some authors associate the concept of contagion merely with the simultaneous emergence 
of financial crises. Others distinguish between spill-overs which are unrelated to fundamentals 
and those which reflect fundamental characteristics of an economy (Schinasi and Smith 1999). 
Obviously, the appropriate definition of fundamentals becomes an issue when following this 
definition.  
Rigobon and Forbes (1999) have additionally pointed out that it might be useful to distinguish 
between propagation and contagion. Propagation denotes normal market linkages through, for 
instance, high correlations of returns, while contagion implies a change in the pattern of return 
correlations during a crisis. According to this fairly strict definition, contagion is thus a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock has occurred in one country.  
Obviously, the policy implications of these different definitions differ vastly. If observed co-
movements of markets during crises simply reflect normal co-movements, policy action might be 
counterproductive because it might disrupt normal market linkages which raise overall economic 
welfare. If, in contrast, contagion is a synonym for crisis and if crises have long-run negative 
effects both short-term and long-term policy measures may be needed. For all practical purposes, 
it will be extremely difficult to decide whether or not spill-overs of crises elsewhere which affect 
the domestic economy should be taken as a mere by-product of economic integration and might 
thus be tolerated. Essentially, economic policy must then weigh the risks against the benefits of 
integration. 
Forbes and Rigobon (1999) also show that the measurement of correlation coefficients must 
take into account that these estimates are biased during crisis periods. During crisis periods, 
measured correlations are biased upward, and without correction for this bias, an increase in 
correlations would be diagnosed too frequently. Forbes and Rigobon thus propose to adjust the 
correlation coefficient according to the following formula: ( )[ ]211 ctt
c
t
t
ρδ
ρρ
−+
=  where ctρ  is 
the unconditional, unadjusted correlation coefficient and tδ  is the relative increase in the variance 
of returns in the crisis country. Using this method, Forbes and Rigobon (2000) find no significant 
increase in return correlations during recent financial crises in Latin America. Linne (1999) uses 
the same methodology and distinguishes between positive contagion (an increase in return 
correlations) and negative contagion (declining correlations). Evidence for positive and negative 
contagion differs between crisis episodes. While the Czech crisis of 1997 had little positive 
contagion effects and some negative effects, mainly in Eastern Europe, the Asian financial crisis 
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of the summer of 1997 had relatively strong and positive global contagion but hardly any negative 
contagion effects. The Russian crisis of August 1998 showed no features of negative contagion 
but some positive contagion effects in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Applying the same 
method to longer-term time series, Bordo and Murshid (2000) reach similar conclusions and 
argue that there is little evidence that recent financial crises have been more contagious than 
earlier ones. 
4. THE ROLE OF BANKS IN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
So far, our analysis has not dealt with the special role of banks in linking national financial mar-
kets. Yet, stylized facts suggest not only that banks remain a major channel for capital flows in 
particular for emerging markets but also that the stability and the efficiency of the domestic bank-
ing system is a crucial factor in the emergence and severity of financial crises. Hence, in this sec-
tion, we will go into more detail with regard to the potential effects that opening up for foreign 
banks can have for the efficiency and the stability of domestic banking systems, and we will dis-
cuss the role of domestic banks during balance of payments crises. 
4.1. Opening up for Foreign Banks 
With regard to the optimal sequence of financial liberalization, it has often been argued that the 
capital account of the balance of payments should be liberalized only after the domestic financial 
system has been deregulated, and that the opening of markets for foreign competition in financial 
services should proceed only gradually (Cho and Khatkhate 1989, Gelb and Sagari 1990, 
Mathieson 1980, Reisen and Fischer 1993). However, this argument ignores that liberalizing the 
capital account quickly and in particular allowing entry of foreign financial institutions can be an 
efficient way to remove distortions in domestic financial markets. Hence, a reversed sequence or 
at least parallel reform sequence might be considered as well.9  
When deriving policy implications for transition economies from this literature, it needs to be 
borne in mind that in these countries internal financial liberalization has been a much more 
encompassing task than in most other emerging markets. This is because in transition economies 
internal financial liberalization has implied the creation of a market-based financial system from 
its infancies: the monobank had to be abolished and to be replaced by a two-tier banking system. 
As new commercial banks were typically carved out of the existing monobank structures, thereby 
inheriting the existing loan portfolios, the issue of how to deal with the non-performing loans on 
their balance sheets had to be solved. In addition, internal financial liberalization required the lift-
_______________ 
9  An early proponent of this view has been Lal (1987).  
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ing of administrative controls on the activities of commercial banks, i.e., the abolition of interest 
rate and credit controls as well as the termination of subsidized lending programs. 
In a simple, static framework, the case against unrestricted market access for foreign banks can 
be made by noting that domestic banks in transition economies which struggle with a vast array 
of operational inefficiencies and with low-quality assets are unable to compete on equal terms 
with foreign rivals. The incumbent domestic banks have inherited loans from the former regime 
of central planning, and they typically lack both experienced personnel and reliable sources of 
information on enterprise performance needed to perform a reliable credit assessment. Substantial 
amounts of new non-performing loans on the balance sheets of commercial banks have typically 
been the result. While cross-country comparisons of the scale of non-performing loans are 
complicated by different accounting standards, loan write-off regulations, or provisioning 
requirements, irregular assets have been substantial for quite some time into the reform process 
(Graph 3). In 1995, Hungarian and Polish commercial banks still reported about 15-20 percent of 
their loans as being classified. Meanwhile, these shares have gone down to 10 percent or less. In 
the Czech Republic, in contrast, about one third of the banks’ loan portfolios remain in a critical 
state. 
Figure 3    
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Source: Buch (2001) 
 
In the presence of non-performing assets, banks are in the need to earn sufficiently high interest 
rate spreads on the profitable part of their operations in order to offset past losses and to maintain 
their operations (Buch 1997). High spreads, however, cannot be sustained if market access is 
liberalized: As the number of competitors rises, the equilibrium loan rate converges to the bank’s 
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marginal costs. This mechanism is the main rationale behind suggestions to postpone external 
financial liberalization until internal financial liberalization has taken place, and until domestic 
banks have recapitalized themselves through retained profits. The main concern about the market 
entry of foreign banks stems from the fact that they not only have a balance sheet which is free of 
non-performing loans but that they also tend to have lower operating costs than domestic banks. 
Hence, their presence in the market may be even more detrimental to the incumbent banks than 
the emergence of new domestic financial institutions.  
The market entry of foreign banks thus potentially forces existing banks out of the market, and 
it may hinder the market entry of new domestic banks. Bankruptcies of incumbent banks, in turn, 
have negative implications not only because (uninsured) depositors would lose their savings but 
also because banking failures might have spill-over effects on other banks, and because 
information capital might be destroyed. Finally, the fact that market entry as such puts downward 
pressure on interest rate spreads may reduce the monitoring incentives of commercial banks, thus 
potentially increasing the riskiness of banks’ assets (Aizenman 1998, Gehrig 1998). Hence, a 
government which assigns a high weight to domestic banks' profits would decide to postpone 
external financial liberalization until the efficiency of domestic banking has improved 
sufficiently. 
Another argument which is often voiced against the market entry of foreign banks is the fear 
that foreign banks pick only the ”best” clients, leaving the domestic banking sector with a pool of 
low-return, high-risk enterprises. A related concern is that foreign banks refrain from lending to 
domestic firms. Yet, these arguments do not justify to shield transition economies from 
competition in financial services for two reasons. 
First, ex ante and ex post knowledge about the quality of loan customers must be 
distinguished. Ex ante asymmetries in information are one main rationale for the existence of 
financial intermediaries in general and of banks in particular. Because the quality of prospective 
borrowers can typically not be assessed with certainty prior to the writing of a loan contract, 
screening and sorting mechanisms need to be designed which help to overcome informational 
asymmetries. The fact that foreign banks tend to operate with clients which ex post are revealed to 
have an above average profitability might simply imply that these banks have developed better 
risk assessment techniques than the domestic banks. These abilities cannot be utilized if markets 
are protected. 
Second, even if a theoretical case can be made for welfare costs of opening up the domestic 
banking industry, the potential benefits of such a policy must be taken into account as well. 
Generally, the case for international trade in financial services can be made in an analogy to 
international trade in goods. Free trade in financial services allows countries to exploit these 
comparative advantages. 
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Apart from the utilization of comparative advantages in producing financial services, FDI in 
banking can contribute to a transfer of know-how into the domestic banking system and to 
improving its efficiency. Hence, substantial gains from higher quality intermediation can be 
realized. In addition, foreign banks can improve the corporate governance of domestic banks if 
they acquire stakes in the privatized banks. Incidentally, this has been the main rationale behind 
the decisions of the authorities in most reform countries to closely involve foreign banks into the 
process of bank privatization (Buch 2001). 
Moreover, because one main reason for the existence of banks is their ability to process 
information more efficiently than other market participants, experience, prior customer relations, 
and human resource endowments are driving forces behind the international expansion of banks. 
The importance of existing customer relations implies that trade in goods and FDI in banking 
may be complements. The direction of causality is not clear, however. While banks may merely 
be following their customers into foreign countries, they may as well be present in foreign 
markets prior to their corporate clients and provide information about the new market. Hence, 
liberalizing the market access of foreign banks might have a positive welfare effect also through 
this channel. 
From a theoretical point of view, market entry of foreign banks can thus have positive and 
negative implications for the efficiency and profitability of the domestic banking system. On the 
one hand, potentially more efficient banks enter the market and allow for a transfer of skills and 
technology. Domestic banks, on the other hand, may go bankrupt because of inferior cost and 
incentive structures. This may have negative welfare consequences. Which of these two effects 
dominates is ultimately an empirical issue.  
The empirical literature on the foreign activities of commercial banks by and large shows that 
the benefits of foreign entry outweigh the potential costs. The following stylized facts are borne 
out by the majority of studies on foreign banking: 
First, a vast amount of empirical evidence suggests that foreign banks merely follow their 
clients abroad (see Buch (2000) for a survey). Therefore, their foreign activities are highly 
complementary to their business at home, and the same type of business may not be available to 
host-country banks. Foreign banks make use of the specific customer relationship that they have 
build up which cannot easily be replicated by a domestic bank. The relevant alternative to the 
presence of foreign banks abroad may thus be that they service their customers through the 
foreign bank’s home country headquarters. 
Second, in developing countries, foreign banks tend to be more profitable than domestic banks 
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 1998).10 While domestic banks indeed lost market 
_______________ 
10  This is not usually the case for developed market economies where the profitability of foreign banks tends to be 
below average (Berger et al. 2001). 
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shares and became less profitable as foreign banks entered, the overall welfare effect on the 
domestic economy is positive. In addition, it seems to be the number of foreign entrants rather 
than their market shares which has the greatest impact on welfare because of the positive effects 
for competition. Recent evidence for Argentina and Mexico additionally suggests increased 
stability of local banking markets precipitated by foreign entry (Goldberg et al. 1999). In these 
countries, foreign entry had a positive impact on loan growth, coupled with a reduction in the 
volatility of loan growth. 
Third, foreign banks usually maintain only a small presence in the retail segment of the host 
country banking industry. Mainly, they provide trade-related services such as foreign exchange 
and payments services, or the settlement of securities. It has been only very recently that foreign 
banks have expanded also in the retail banking segments of the host market. The privatization of 
domestic banks has in many cases been a key trigger for foreign entry into retail banking. 
Evidence supporting this view is documented for the case of Spanish banks in Latin America 
(Guillen and Tschoegl 1999) and for the expansion of foreign banks into Hungary (Bonin and 
Abel 2000). Hence, greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions are not perfect 
substitutes. This suggests that foreign entrants often prefer to work with existing domestic banks 
rather than competing with them.  
Positive effects of foreign entry in banking have also been documented for transition 
economies. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Buch (2001) finds that initially, there 
has indeed been a fear that domestic banks would be unable to withstand competitive pressure of 
foreign banks, and hence that foreign entry would cause the failure of domestic financial 
institutions. But while there have certainly been liquidations of domestic banks, these have had a 
relatively modest scope and were typically restricted to small and mid-sized banks. Overall, the 
entry of foreign banks has thus not caused large-scale banking failure.  
Quite to the contrary, it seems that the performance of the banking sector has been superior in 
those countries which have taken a relatively liberal approach towards foreign banks.11 This 
would confirm earlier studies on the impact of foreign bank entry on bank profitability. Evidence 
from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also shows clearly that foreign banks find it more 
difficult to obtain market shares in the deposit as compared to the lending business. At the same 
time, market shares in retail banking are very high in some countries, notably in Hungary, 
suggesting that foreign banks not only take a follow-their-customer strategy but rather engage 
actively in retail banking. 
While the above discussion suggests that the benefits of market entry of foreign banks in 
emerging markets probably outweigh potential risks, the role of foreign banks in balance of 
payments crises must be considered as well. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) find, for 
instance, that so-called ‚common lender’ effects have promoted spill-over effects during the Thai 
_______________ 
11 See in the Graph A2 (page 46) appendix for the market shares of foreign banks in selected transition economies. 
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and Mexican financial crises. Hence, when analyzing the welfare implications of foreign entry, 
these potential costs must be considered as well. In the following section, we focus on a possible 
link between the international activities of commercial banks and the emergence of financial cri-
ses, namely the exposure of banks to foreign exchange risks. 
4.2. Twin Crises 
Banks in the transition economies have emerged as important channels of foreign capital either 
directly by borrowing abroad or indirectly by guaranteeing loans (Graph 4). In particular during 
the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the share of lending to banks in total 
loans granted by the BIS reporting banks has clearly been above the average for developed market 
economies, in particular for the second round candidates to EU accession. Since then, and espe-
cially in the aftermath of the financial crises of the late 1990s, it has fallen substantially, and for 
all reform countries has recently been below the developed-country average. This may in fact in-
dicate that the potential vulnerability of the banking systems to financial crises has become a 
greater concern for international lenders. 
A domestic banking crisis can trigger a balance of payments crisis for instance if the fiscal 
costs of rescuing the domestic banking sector create macroeconomic imbalances (Calvo 1995, 
Velasco 1987). In addition, a balance of payments crisis can also erupt when, as a result of a do-
mestic banking crises, domestic banks lose their international creditworthiness, so that bank-
intermediated capital inflows dry up. Feedback effects can reinforce this effect if domestic banks 
hold open foreign exchange positions (Buch and Heinrich 1999) because devaluations or devalua-
tion expectations drive up interest rates. This can cause additional losses in the banking sector 
(Mishkin 1997). The danger is particularly pronounced for countries suffering from weak 
financial regulation and supervision (McKinnon und Pill 1995).  
Figure 4    
Share of Lending to Banks 1985–2000 
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Source: BIS (2000, Table 7) 
 
For transition economies in particular, a high exposure of the commercial banking system to 
nonperforming assets can be one trigger for twin crises. In some countries, substantial advances 
have been made with regard to the solution of the problem of nonperforming loans on the balance 
sheets of banks (cf. Graph 3 above).  However, the track record is less promising for some of the 
late reformers. 
The prominent role of commercial banks as channels of foreign capital highlights the 
importance of safeguards against excessive foreign borrowing of banks. Still, results presented in 
Buch and Heinrich (1999) suggest caution against the use of reserve requirements or of other 
restrictions to the open foreign exchange position of banks solely as a means to protect the 
balance of payments. These restrictions, which raise the costs of foreign loans relative to 
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domestic deposits, may have the unintended effect of speeding up rather than delaying balance of 
payments problems. In fact, the reduction in capital inflows due to the capital controls may be a 
reason why countries such as Chile, Croatia, or Slovenia have abolished their controls in the wake 
of the recent decline in capital flows to emerging markets. 
At the same time, the results derived in Buch and Heinrich (1999) stress the need to impose 
regulations on banks’ activities which are motivated by prudential considerations and which do 
not distort the relative prices of banks’ liabilities. Also, effective ways to reform the deposit 
insurance system and to put it on an explicit basis must be found. A regulatory framework which 
takes foreign exchange risks into account is already given by the core principles for effective 
banking supervision of the Bank for International Settlements and need not be designed anew for 
the reform countries. Likewise, the regulations of the EU concerning capital adequacy address 
foreign exchange risks. In implementing these guidelines, it is particularly important to utilize a 
comprehensive definition of market risk and to take off-balance sheet activities into account. The 
transition economies should consider in addition that the general guidelines have mainly been 
drafted with an eye on banks from developed market economies. Hence it may be necessary to 
impose tighter standards during the period of transition. 
5. TAXES ON SHORT-TERM CAPITAL FLOWS AS A SOLUTION? 
If short-term capital flows are more volatile than other forms of capital inflows, wouldn’t it make 
sense to lower the share of short-term capital flows by imposing a tax on these types of capital 
flows? In this section, we briefly discuss the pros and cons of such policies and the determinants 
of short-term capital flows. 
5.1. Determinants of Short-Term Capital Flows 
Despite the increased interest in the determinants of short-term capital flows, empirical evidence 
on these factors is relatively scarce. An exception is the work by Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
They find for a panel of 32 developing countries that the share of short-term debt is positively 
related to the ratio of M2 over GDP and to per-capita income. Foreign trade activities, measured 
as the ratio of imports over GDP, in contrast, do not have a significant impact on the maturity 
structure of foreign debt. These results are obtained when estimating the model either for a cross-
section of countries for the year 1995 or in form of a panel with fixed effects for the years 1988-
1997. 
Buch and Lusinyan (2000) extend this analysis to analyze the determinants of short-term bank 
loans for about 55 recipient countries. Using a substantially larger dataset than earlier work by 
Rodrik and Velasco (1999), they confirm their basic result with the share of short-term loans be-
ing a positive function of GDP per capita and the size of the financial system of the host country. 
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Generally, the results suggest that determinants of short-term bank loans are similar for developed 
and developing countries. At the same time, regulatory restrictions were found to have an impact 
on the maturity structure of foreign bank lending. OECD membership in particular has a positive 
impact on the share of short-term foreign loans. Presumably, this is due to the risk-weighting 
implied in the BIS capital adequacy standards which requires banks to hold more capital against 
short-term lending to non-OECD countries than against lending to OECD countries or against 
long-term loans. Since the dataset used by Buch and Lusinyan (2000) also includes some transi-
tion economies, we can use their results to obtain an estimate of the deviation of these countries 
from the expected share of short-term capital. That is we are plotting the residuals of the 
equations estimated in Buch and Lusinyan for these countries. Graph 5 shows the results, making 
use of different specifications of the baseline model.  
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Figure 5   
Short-Term Debt in Transition Economies: A Residual Analysis 
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Graph plots the residuals from a regression estimating the determinants of short-term debt. Negative val-
ues imply that the share of short-term debt is below the sample average. Model specification: (1) = base-
line: log GDP per capita and M2/GDP, (2) baseline plus imports/GDP, (3) baseline plus OECD dummy 
and interaction terms, (4) baseline plus OECD, EU, financial centre dummies, share of loans to banks, 
(5) baseline plus OECD dummy, share of loans to banks, (6) baseline plus OECD dummy, share of loans 
to banks, Asia dummy, (7) baseline plus OECD dummy, share of loans to banks, rating, (8) baseline plus 
intercept. See Buch and Lusinyan (2000) for details. 
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In all specifications, most transition economies in the sample show a bias against short-term 
debt when controlling for the determinants of short-term debt identified in Buch and Lusinyan 
(2000). The only exception is the Czech Republic. The deviations are found to be smaller for the 
leading reformers than for Russia. In comparison to the countries which joined the EU in 
previous rounds of enlargement, the transition economies also still show a stronger negative 
deviation from the predicted levels of short-term debt. These results suggest that most of the 
transition economies in the sample actually have scope for raising more short-term debt given 
their current level of economic and financial development.  
5.2. Policy Implications 
On a general level, any policy proposal on how to deal with short-term capital flows must take 
into consideration that short-term capital may not only be more volatile than other forms of 
capital flows, but that it also fulfills an important economic role. Diamond and Rajan (2000) for 
instance focus on the economic role of short-term debt in financing illiquid investment projects 
with a long gestation period. Building on earlier work on the role of banks in providing liquidity 
and creating credit, they argue that an increase in the share of short-term debt might be a rational 
response of markets to adverse macroeconomic shocks or poorly-designed regulations. Improving 
the investment climate and enhancing corporate governance may thus have the side-effect also of 
lowering the share of short-term debt.   
Taxes on short-term capital flows have been proposed as tools to enhance the degree of 
monetary autonomy and to reduce volatility in financial markets. Recent policy discussions have 
focused on unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) of the type implemented in Chile since 
the early 1990s.12 Less attention than to Chile is usually paid to the case of Slovenia although the 
country has had a similar regime since 1995 (Buch and Hanschel 2000).  
Yet, the introduction of restrictions on short-term capital flows can be welfare-enhancing only 
under special conditions. Policymakers should take the following aspects into account: 
First, taxes on capital flows cannot substitute for structural reforms. Recent evidence from the 
currency crises in Asia has shown the importance of structural deficiencies – corporate 
governance issues featuring prominently – for balance of payments problems. Taxes on short-
term capital flows do not solve the problem of the induced exchange rate misalignment but may 
rather delay adjustment efforts. Proponents of a tax would object that it is precisely this additional 
breathing time that governments gain which makes the tax attractive. Yet, this window of oppor-
tunity may fail to deliver what it promises. Externally, the imposition of restrictions on the capital 
_______________ 
12  It should be noted that the taxes on cross-border capital flows which are currently being discussed such as 
imposed by Chile in the 1990s are not Tobin taxes of the pure type. That is, they are not levied on all international 
financial transactions, and they are not imposed multilaterally. 
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capital account may send a negative signal to foreign investors that the authorities are unable to 
solve the structural problems they are facing. This loss in confidence may cause a retreat of 
foreign capital over and above the amount originally intended. Internally, opponents to reforms 
may gain ground if the capital account restrictions shield the country from the consequences of 
inefficient policies, thus preventing efficient use of the additional time. 
Second, the actual design and enforcement of the tax is an open issue. In order to be effective, 
the tax should apply to residents and nonresidents, and to inflows and outflows alike. Domestic 
residents are at least as sensitive to deteriorating news as foreigners are. Restrictions on capital 
inflows only would thus not suffice to reduce the volatility of capital flows. In addition, there is 
no clear-cut evidence as to which type of capital flows are the most volatile and how volatility 
changes after the imposition of controls. 
Third, the capacity and ability to enforce the tax is crucial. If current account and capital 
account transactions have been liberalized in general, agents would be willing to pay any amount 
up to the level of the tax in order to avoid it. While this adjustment mechanism does not 
completely erode the effectiveness of the tax, it still reduces its impact. The Chilean experience 
has revealed that isolated restrictions on individual capital account items are not effective in the 
medium run (for a survey of the evidence see Laurens and Cardoso (1998)). Although the need to 
adjust did not arise instantaneously, capital account restrictions had to be expanded over time in 
order to prevent evasion (Labán and Larrain 1998). Notice, however, that the general notion that 
capital account restrictions can hardly be effective is not unequivocally supported by the Chilean 
evidence as the reserve requirement seems to have served to reduce inflows of short-term capital. 
Eventually, this has induced policymakers to lower the rate of reserves. 
Fourth, even though a transactions tax may be effective in reducing inflows of (short-term) 
capital, it is not clear both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view that the tax 
reduces volatility in financial markets. It can be argued that the introduction of the tax by itself 
can lead to an overshooting of the exchange rate because it is conceptually identical to a negative 
shock to the domestic interest rate (Buch et al. 1998). If – as is the case for the transition 
economies upon membership in the EU – the tax had to be abolished again in the future, this 
adjustment would take place even twice. A similar reasoning applies to transaction taxes being 
used as short-term emergency measures.13 
Fifth, the envisaged membership in the European Union as well as membership in the OECD 
restrains the choices of the transition economies under review. At the same time, the conditions 
of EU membership by themselves can reduce the exposure of the new members to adverse 
external shocks by enhancing macroeconomic stability and by strengthening institutions. 
_______________ 
13  Guitián (1998) for example suggests capital controls not as a standard weapon in a country’s policy arsenal but 
as transitory instruments, ideally being used under the supervision of an international organization. 
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While these issues make us skeptical with regard to the usefulness and effectiveness of taxes 
on (short-term) capital flows, there are yet a few policy lessons that the transition economies can 
take from the evidence.  
First, structural reforms at the domestic level can reduce the exposure of emerging market 
economies to volatile capital flows. Recent evidence suggests that changes in the composition of 
capital inflows away from long-term FDI towards short-term flows in the Asian economies have 
been promoted by sterilization policies which held domestic interest rates at high levels 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998). In addition, there is ample evidence that sticking to fixed 
exchange rate regimes which are inconsistent with domestic fundamentals increases the risk of a 
crisis. This risk is particularly pronounced if weak macroeconomic fundamentals coincide with 
weak institutions and incentive systems at a micro-level. 
Second, perhaps the most important policy implication apart from the need for sound structural 
reforms is the crucial need to disseminate transparent, timely, and reliable information to the 
international investment community. Better information policies would substantially reduce the 
costs of obtaining information for market participants. Although this would not eliminate the 
presence of noise traders, improved availability of information is likely to increase the importance 
of fundamentalists in the market.  
Finally, because commercial banks are a key link between domestic and international financial 
markets, they also face substantial exposure to foreign exchange risks. Hence, safeguards against 
excessive foreign borrowing of banks should be a focus of policymakers.  
6. SUMMARY AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Successful and sustained integration into international capital markets is one of the major 
challenges facing transition economies today. While global capital markets are more integrated 
today than they had been for a long time, progress has been uneven, and the process of integration 
has hardly been smooth for developing and transition economies. The overwhelming bulk of 
international capital movements today still takes place between developed economies. Even 
though the share of developing and transition economies has been on the rise, a number of these 
economies have suffered periodic setbacks through financial crises. This paper has surveyed the 
evidence on the integration of international capital markets and the role of transition economies in 
this process, and has discussed the causes and implications of financial crises with a particular 
emphasis on the microeconomic aspects of the problem. 
While in quantitative terms, the degree of integration that the transition economies have 
achieved already is fairly high, the structure of their capital flows yet remains different from that 
of more developed market economies. Hence, as transition continues, and as these countries join 
the EU, the major impact is likely to be changes in the structure of capital flows towards 
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securitized financial assets. This supported by the empirical finding that clear differences exist 
between developed and developing economies with regard to the structure of capital flows. 
Whereas portfolio inflows have dominated in developed economies, developing economies have 
relied on portfolio capital, foreign direct investment and other investments in roughly equal 
proportions. In terms of the maturity structure of international capital flows, short-term debt flows 
rose during the lending boom of the early 1990s, and fell thereafter.  
Recent financial crises have shifted interest away from measures of the degree of capital 
mobility towards measures of the volatility characteristics of different capital account items. This 
shift has been prompted by the observation that capital flows to emerging markets often tend to 
be relatively volatile and that this may hold in particular for short-term capital flows. Also, there 
is evidence that large capital flow reversals have become more frequent in the 1990s.  However, 
despite the extensive policy debate on the volatility of capital flows, sound empirical evidence on 
volatility patterns is rather scarce.  
The experience of recent balance of payments crises in a number of developing and transition 
economies reinforces this point. Of particular concern is the risk of countries pursuing sound 
domestic policies and yet being drawn into crises erupting elsewhere. Evidence for contagion 
differs between crisis episodes. While the Czech crisis of 1997 had some moderate effects mainly 
in Eastern Europe, the Asian financial crisis of the summer of 1997 had relatively strong global 
contagion effects. The Russian crisis of August 1998 showed some contagion effects in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. Overall, there is little evidence that recent financial crises have been 
more contagious than historically observed ones. 
Although contagion is a valid concern, the recent empirical literature on balance of payments 
crises has identified a number of indicators which yield good ex-post forecasts of past crises. The 
developments captured by these indicators can obviously be influenced by domestic economic 
policy, suggesting that crises are often home-made to a considerable degree. Among the most im-
portant causes are inconsistencies on the microeconomic level. In particular, balance of payments 
crises often erupt more or less simultaneously with crises in the domestic banking sector. This 
danger is particularly pronounced for countries suffering from weak financial regulation and su-
pervision. Enhancing the efficiency of the domestic banking system is all the more urgent because 
of the possible feedback effects between banking and balance of payments crises. Opening up for 
foreign banks can be a way to improve the overall efficiency of the domestic financial system. 
The entry of foreign banks increases competitive pressure on their domestic rivals and forces 
them to become more efficient. Moreover, foreign banks often have superior skills allowing them 
to offer more efficient financial services to the host economy. 
Another focal point of the policy debate on international capital flows has been the issue of 
whether presumably excessively volatile short-term capital flows should be discouraged by im-
posing a tax on these types of capital flows. Attempts to avoid balance of payments crises by 
taxing (short-term) capital flows face several problems. First, taxes on capital flows cannot 
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substitute for tackling the structural problems which frequently are at the root of balance of 
payments crises. Second, the proper design and effective enforcement of taxes on short-term 
capital flows is an extremely difficult question. Third, even to the extent that a transactions tax 
can be effective in reducing inflows of (short-term) capital, it is not clear that the tax reduces 
volatility in financial markets. Thus, preference should be given to directly addressing structural 
deficiencies in the host economies, to improving the transparency of the domestic economy to 
international investors, and to put in place proper regulations preventing excessive foreign 
borrowing of banks. 
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Graph A1  
Share of Gross Capital Flows Relative to GDP 1990-1999 
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Graph A1 cont’d  
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Gross capital inflows (outflows) = FDI in reporting economy (abroad) + portfolio investment liabilities 
(assets) + other investments liabilities (assets) 
Source: IMF (IFS) 
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Graph A2  
Market Shares of Foreign Banks (Percent of Total Assets) 1991–2000 
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